If indeed as Harold Wilson once said “a week is a long time in politics” then the time elapsed between now and my last Conter piece would be the equivalent of a political lifetime. I last wrote back in September of the political hangover that was descending on both the UK and Scottish Government, and their strategy for the day-to-day reality of power in a post-Brexit and post-2014 era landscape. I was hoping for impetus, innovation and imagination in the 3 months since – alas, here we are.

As if to clarify the seemingly now ingrained helter-skelter nature of our politics, when writing this column I was alerted to the fact it was the 5th anniversary of Boris Johnson securing the biggest Tory majority since Thatcher and the defeat of Corbynism. Given all that has happened since – from Russia invading Ukraine, a Brexit deal being secured, the fall of 3 British PM’s and 2 Scottish FM’s, the arrest of Nicola Sturgeon in relation to a police investigation into SNP finances, and the death of Alex Salmond to name but just a few – I’m certain, the conclusion of these opening remarks should be seen with this political volatility in mind.

Centrally it comes down to this: I firmly believe, and frankly despair, that our current political trajectory lands Nigel Farage as a key player at the heart of a populist right-wing UK Government by 2029 combined with a significant Reform presence in Holyrood, potentially carrying the balance of power post 2026. The polling trends back this view, consistently. The question then for socialists is to try and understand the central themes of this phenomenon before beginning to develop a response. That work needs to be much more than has been the case until now if we are to even attempt to make inroads and stop this advance.

I should say at the outset – I don’t profess nor claim to be capable of understanding fully the nature of the appeal of Reform. I am however perhaps better placed than others to attempt to analyse this. I am within their main target group and the a cohort who are rallying behind them in great numbers. This applies not just to Reform but to right-wing populists and strongman leader types across Europe and the US.

So what is the appeal? For me, there are two factors. One is economic. This is where any decent socialist analysis of the situation we find ourselves should be rooted. Our conclusions provide clear red water between those with a class based analysis of society, based on material living conditions, and a more liberally orientated and “morality” centred opposition to Reform. As with much of the state of politics globally, the roots of the Reform expansion can be traced back to the financial crisis of 2008, and the response from western capitalism, governments and institutions.

The UK in this regard is a case in point, as a Tory-Liberal coalition engaged more enthusiastically than most in austerity programmes from 2010 and the ideologically driven shredding of the size and role of the state. Leaving those who had little to nothing in the first place even further behind and further devastating once proud working class communities of industry and work as wastelands of poverty and ill health. Leaving local authorities decimated and our public services at crisis point – reversing many of the hard fought for advances in working class life.

Only a class based response to these measures and a political programme unashamedly committed to addressing (through taxation and radical wealth redistribution) the drastic need for investment in our public services and our local authorities even begins to address the multiple crisis which are driving Reform support. From health provision, educational attainment, housing supply and transport infrastructure to name but just a few. Contrary to traditional right-wing thinking, when polled via social attitude surveys, Reform voters are broadly supportive of measures like public ownership, trade union/workplace rights and protections and state intervention in key economic sectors – as is the public at large.

Given this tendency to support what would be traditional left-wing points of view on economics, it’s clear to anyone willing to see it that something deeper and more significant is at play here too. The second factor: emotion. Although distinct in its own right this can’t entirely be separated from the economic consequences of 2008 which inevitably and understandably led people to become protective over the little they have in a world of increasing complexity and uncertainty. And crucially, a lack of control over their own life and destiny. This drives a desire to hold onto other non-economic societal and perceived cultural expectations and norms which people feel they can control and in some cases have held for decades. Sometimes perhaps as a result of religious faith, “family values” or just simple cultural activities.

The lack of economic prosperity in 21st century capitalism of course is never reflective of how hard you work. The greatest con trick of a capitalist society is the claim that it rewards hard work. All too often our most hard working are also our lowest paid or lowest valued. A failure to understand and to articulate the emotional impact of this lack of agency and stagnation of conditions means the left are simply not connecting with a working class base to the same extent as the radical right. Often in fact, the left is viewed as dismissive of the importance of long established traditions or faith and how these might relieve some of the psychological impacts of contemporary 21st century capitalism. How else to explain the inherent contradiction in terms of billionaires like Trump and Musk or City traders like Farage being legitimately conceived as a political representative for working people?

It’s no surprise to me that “culture war” issues have been driving the political divides of the last decade when presented with this framework and capitalism’s dominance in the economic sphere. Throw in the lack of any serious economic alternatives being presented by traditional left of centre forces like the Democrats in the US or Labour and the SNP at home. The only exceptions to this was the Independence Referendum of 2014 and Corbyn’s Labour in 2017 which both running on an anti-austerity, anti-establishment insurgent campaign style managed to energise a whole new section of previously alienated sections of the working class and in the case of Scotland almost delivered the breakup of the British state itself. Now in Scotland, at the end of 2024, we have realistically a year to stem the flow of Reform advance and begin to demand action on key issues affecting working class communities.

A place to start would be sustainable and radical reform of local Government funding, replacing the hated and unfair council tax with an income based alternative and ending the ridiculously inadequate house building programme that saw a 12% decrease in all sector housebuilding starts and a 10% decrease in completions between 2023 and 2024. In the 12 months ending September 2024, there was less than 20,000 homes built across the whole of Scotland, with less than a quarter of those being in the social sector (4,772) – this at a time the Scottish Government has declared a national housing emergency. In the social sector, new build starts in the last 2 years have been at their lowest level in Scotland for 20 years. Far and away missing the 100,000 new socially rented homes built to the highest environmental standard that the country so badly needs.

Only by showing in the next 12 months that we can address the rampant insecurity experienced across working class life – from employment to housing and health provision – can we hope to begin to halt the Reform advance and push back the tide of right wing populism, a disease that Scotland, despite what its comfortable political class likes to assume, is no more immune to than the rest of the world. The need for an independent socialist analysis and programme could not be more stark.

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